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In 1961 the West Virginia Legislature moved the assessment
date for real and personal property taxes from December 31 back
to the first day of July.' Since that time uncertainty has existed
as to the effect of this change on the tax year.' Some attorneys
felt that this assessment date change put the West Virginia tax
year on a fiscal year basis while others believed that the tax year
was unchanged and remained on a calendar year basis.' The
issue apparently has been settled by the recent decision of the
West Virginia Supreme Court in the case of George F. Hazelwood
Co. v. Pitsenbarger.' After discussing the point in some detail,
the court concluded that the tax year is still the calendar year.'
This conclusion, however, may be dictum because the question
W. VA. CoDE ch. 11A, art. 1, §2 (Michie 1961).
2 Brown, Changes in West Virginia Real Property Tax Law, 66 W. VA.
L. REv. 271 (1964).
3 t bid.
4.141 S.E.2d 314 (1965), appeal denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 392 (1965).
5 id. at 317.
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was not directly submitted to the court. The plaintiff-taxpayer,
for purposes of his claim, had conceded that the tax year was
still the calendar year.'
A second and more significant problem considered by the court
in the Hazelwood case concerned the propriety of taxing property
in accordance with the changed assessment date but which was
not located within the state at any time during the tax period. F, a
foreign corporation, moved heavy equipment into West Virginia
in 1960 for the purpose of doing business in the state. This equip-
ment remained in the state until some time in December, 1961.
Pursuant to the December 31, 1960 assessment and levy thereon,
P paid personal property taxes on its equipment for 1961. In ac-
cordance with the 1961 assessment date change, P's property was
assessed for 1962 and taxes levied thereon for that year because
it was located in the state on July 1, 1961. Because P's property
had been taxed by Maryland for 1962 and because none of P's pro-
perty was in West Virginia during that year, P filed a petition in
the County Court of Pendleton County to obtain a refund for the
first half of the 1962 taxes paid by it and for an exoneration from
the payment of taxes for the second half of the year 1962. The
County Court's order denying the relief prayed for in the petition
was reversed by the Circuit Court of Pendleton County, and P ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Held,
reversed. The court said that the property had acquired a "tax
situs" in the state on the date fixed by the legislature for the as-
sessment of property taxes. The tax is determined by the assess-
ment date even though the property has been removed from the
state before the tax is due or before it actually has been levied."
It is the purpose of this note to examine the constitutional as-
pects of taxing property which was located within the taxing juris-
diction at the time of the assessment date, but which was not
located within the taxing jurisdiction at any time during the tax
period. Decisions of other jurisdictions which assess taxes prior
to the tax period will be compared in an attempt to arrive at
the constitutional basis for this method of taxation.
AssEssmENT PfaoR To TAx PmEIoD
Although not a prevalent practice, the assessment of property
taxes prior to the tax period is not unusual. Five jurisdictions, in
6 bid.
7George F. Hazelwood Co. v. Pitsenbarger, supra note 4.
1966]
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addition to West Virginia, have been found to assess property
in this manner.'
Oklahoma has a long history of assessing real and personal
property six months prior to the tax period.' It has been held on
many occasions that the assessment date in that jurisdiction is
January 1 for the ensuing fiscal and tax year beginning the follow-
ing July 1.10 If property is subject to taxation on January 1, a
voluntary change in the ownership of that property between the
assessment date and the date of levy for the Oklahoma tax year
does not change the tax status of that property." Even where
property has become exempt from taxation after the assessment
date but prior to the tax period, it has been held that such property
is taxable nevertheless for the tax period next ensuing the assess-
ment date.'" Taxability is thus determined as of the date fixed
by law for such purposes, i.e., the assessment date.'3
Although the Oklahoma tax assessment scheme has been attack-
ed as "absurd,"'" the Oklahoma court has said this contention is
without merit.'" The court indicated that it might consider as
"absurd" a situation where property assessed on January 1 ceased
8 California, Kentucky, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico. As far as
municipal taxes are concerned, it has been held specifically that property
is assessed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania prior to the tax period. Provident
Trust Co. v. Judicial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 112 Pa. Super. 352, 171 Adt. 287
(1934).
9 In re Assessment of Champlin Ref. Co., 186 Okla, 625, 99 P.2d 880
(1940).
10 In re Assessment of Champlin Ref. Co., supra note 9; In re Sinclair
Prarie Oil Co., 175 Okla. 289, 53 P.2d 221 (1935); In re Texas Co.'s Assess-
ment, 168 Okla. 94, 31 P.2d 929 (1934). See Oxr.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §
15.6 (1951).
1 "Board of Comm'rs v. Central Baptist Church, 136 Okla. 99, 102, 276
Pac. 726, 729 (1929).
'2 Muskogee County, Okla. v. United States, 133 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 745 (1943); Board of County Commr's v. Serber,
318 U.S. 705 (1942), affirming, 130 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1942). The Serber
case dealt with property tax exemptions for certain Indian lands in Oklahoma.
An exemption act, 25 U.S.C. § 412a, passed on June 20, 1936, exempted
Indians under the guardianship of the United States from paying state real
property taxes. The taxpayer was not exempted from paying property taxes
for the fiscal year 1936-37. "Under Oklahoma law, the taxable status of
property in Oklahoma is fixed as of the assessment date, January 1, in each
year, although taxes are levied as of July 1. [Citations omitted]. For purposes
of this case, we assume without deciding that the status of the property on
the assessment date is determinative." Id. at 709 n.5.
13Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 104 Okla. 271, 232 Pac. 425 (1924),
rev'd on other grounds, 271 U.S. 609 (1926).
14 In re Assessment of Champlin Ref. Co., supra note 9.
15 Id. at 626, 99 P.2d at 881-882.
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to exist before the tax was levied. However, without discussing any
constitutional issues, the court upheld the assessment scheme say-
ing that, "Whatever absurdities do or might result . . . must be
held to be dispelled or overcome by the necessity for a fixed
assessment date."1 6
New Jersey is another jurisdiction which assesses ad valorem
taxes prior to the tax period. Taxes on real property are assessed
on October 1 for the tax year beginning the following January I.'
Where a nontax-exempt property owner conveyed his property to
a tax-exempt entity after October I but prior to January 1, the
grantor was held liable for the taxes."8 Conversely, property
exempt from taxation on October I was not taxable for the en-
suing calendar year even though subsequently conveyed to a
taxable entity.' 9 Thus, the status of the property at the assessment
date determines liability for taxes rather than its status as of
the tax period.2"
In California, taxes are assessed on the first Monday in March2'
for the fiscal year beginning the next July 1.2 Where property
was condemned for eminent domain purposes after the first Mon-
day in March but prior to the beginning of the tax period, a Cali-
fornia court held that it was proper to deduct from the eminent
domain award the property taxes for the ensuing fiscal year.2
As taxes in California become a lien on the property at the time
of assessment,"4 the courts have reasoned that such lien may be
16 Ibid.
17 City of East Orange v. Palmer, 82 N.J. Super. 258, 197 A.2d 410
(1964); Shelton College v. Borough of Ringwood, 48 N.J. Super. 10, 136
A.2d 660 (1957). See N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §4-23 (1960).18 Lakewood Judean Lodge No. 1351 B'nai B'rith v. Lakewood, 25 N.J.
Misc. 421, 54 A.2d 691 (1947); Corrado v. City of Hoboken, 20 N.J. Misc.
134, 25 A.2d 287 (1942).19 Jaybert Operating Corp. v. City of Newark, 16 N.J. Super. 505, 85
A.2d 216 (1951); Majob Realty Corp. v. City of Hoboken, 25 N.J. Misc. 464,
55 A.2d 163 (1947).
20 But see Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City v. Monteville, 84 NJ.L. 43,
85 Atl. 838 (1913), aff'd, 85 N.J.L. 372, 91 At. 1069 (1913).
21 CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 405 (Deering 1963).22 City of Long Beach v. Aistrup, 164 Cal. App. 2d 41, 330 P.2d 282
(1958); City of Santa Monica v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. App. 710,
115 Pac. 945 (1910).
23 State v. Clyne, 175 Cal. App. 2d 204, 345 P.2d 474 (1959); See also
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enforced irrespective of subsequent events. 5
The Political Code of Puerto Rico provided that taxes were
to be assessed on January 1526 for the fiscal year beginning the
next July 1.27 In the leading case of Teachers' Ass'n v. Bonet28
the Puerto Rican court held that the assessment date determined
liability for taxation and changes in circumstances between that
date and the tax period would not change that liability.29 The
validity of the Puerto Rico assessment was discussed to a limited
extent in Puerto Rico v. Palo Seco Fruit Co." In that case the
Government of Puerto Rico was seeking to recover taxes for the
fiscal year 1941-42 out of a condemnation award made to the
defendant for property condemned in October, 1941, by the United
States Government. The lower court allowed only half of the
property taxes to be recovered by Puerto Rico. Although not bas-
ing its decision on this ground, the lower court said that it would
be inequitable to require a taxpayer to pay a tax on property he
did not own at the tax period. The appellate court, however, dis-
agreed by way of a dictum, saying that because the Puerto Rico
tax statute made the owner of property on January 1 personally
liable for the payment of the tax' and because that statute created
a lien on the property at that date,32 it would not be inequitable to
enforce such a tax.
25 The theory used by the California courts in upholding the assessment
prior to the tax period is based on the enforceability of a mortgage covering
future advancements. "A mortgage covering future advancements, as against
subsequent encumberances becomes a lien upon the whole sum advanced from
the time of its execution although the right to enforce its collection thereof
can only arise upon each advancement made. The analogy lies in this, that a
lien declared by a positive statute is not dependent for its existance upon sub-
sequent acts requisite to its enforcement." Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383,
386-387, 19 Pac. 641, 643 (1888).
This analogy would not apply in West Virginia, however, because the
lien does not attach until after the tax year. Brown, supra note 2, at 277.
This theory would not apply in New Jersey either as taxes assessed on
October 1 for the ensuing calendar year do not become a lien until the next
January 1. Milmar v. Borough of Fort Lee, 36 N.J. Super. 241, 115 A.2d
592 (1955).26 P. R. POL. CODE § 297 (1911).2 7 Puerto Rico v. United States, 131 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1942); Buscoglia
v. Tax Court, 68 P.R.R. 34 (1948); Buscoglia v. Tax Court, 63 P.R.R. 37
(1944); Roig v. Bonet, 54 P.R.R. 617 (1939); Teachers' Ass n v. Bonet, 54
P.R.R. 511 (1939).
28 Supra note 27.
92 Id. at 515.
30 136 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1943).
3, See note 27, supra.
32 Puerto Rico v. United States, supra note 27, held that the Puerto
Rican lien for taxes attaches prior to the tax period as in California. The
[Vol. 68
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Kentucky has provided that certain classes of cities may assess
property prior to the tax period.3 Once a city adopts an assess-
ment plan pursuant to the statute, however, it cannot subsequently
deviate from that plan. 4 It has been held that an assessment made
at the beginning of the tax period is invalid if the city has departed
from its adopted assessment plan.3"
In summary it appears that the assessment date determines the
tax liability of property located within the taxing jurisdiction at
that date, and changes in the ownership or value of property
after that date will have no effect on the liability to pay the tax. 6
The date fixed by statute controls the power to tax particular
property. The date fixed may work some inequities, but the prac-
tical aspects of tax administration require that tax liability be
determined at a particular time.3"
In none of the cases above cited was the constitutionality of the
assessment prior to the tax period challenged or discussed by the
courts. It has been held uniformly that the fixing of the assess-
ment date and the period to which it is to relate is a purely legisla-
tive function. The practical aspects of tax administration have
been of prime consideration in the decisions of these cases.
CONSTrrUTiONAL BAsIS OF PROPERtTY TAxATON
The constitutional justification for upholding the property tax
rests on the idea that the taxpayer has derived benefits and protec-
tion from the laws of the taxing state for the period to which the
tax relates. In the leading case advancing this view,38 the state of
Kentucky attempted to assess taxes on railroad cars owned by the
court, however, did not use the analogy of a mortgage covering future ad-
vancements to justify such an assessment scheme. It stated that it was in
the legislative province to fix liability for property taxes. Again these cases
may be distinguished from the situation in West Virginia where the lien does
not attach until after the tax period. Brown, supra note 25.
33 See Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 92 § 420 (1963).3 4 City of St. Matthews v. Truehart, 274 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1954).3
.
5 Ibid. See City of St. Matthews v. Stollings, 298 S.W.2d 676 (Ky.
1957).
36As discussed previously, supra notes 25 & 32, some jurisdictions
resolve their assessment schemes on the basis of a lien attaching prior to the
tax period. However, as other jurisdictions uphold an assessment prior to the
tax period without the benefit of such lien, it would a ppear that the "lien
theory" is not the only and perhaps not the best line of reasoning to follow
in explaining such an assessment procedure.
37 3 CooLEY, TBE LAw OF TAxATioN § 1062 (4th ed. 1924).
18 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
1966]
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taxpayer which never had been located in the taxing jurisdiction
during the tax period. In striking down the assessment the Supreme
Court said, "The power of taxation . . . is exercised upon the
assunption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the pro-
tection of his person and property."39 Subsequent cases have
adhered to this doctrine"0 and have further refined the rule. "[T]he
only question is whether the tax in practical operation has relation
to opportunity, benefits or protection conferred or awarded by the
taxing state."4' If the taxing jurisdiction cannot give to the property
taxed the benefits and protection of its laws, taxation would amount
to confiscation of property without due process of law. 2 In each
of the cases which espoused this rule,43 however, it appeared that
the assessment date occurred at the beginning of or during the
tax period. Therefore, the property sought to be taxed was not
in the taxing jurisdiction at the time fixed for assessment.
If the property is located within the taxing jurisdiction at the
time fixed for assessment, but not within the taxing jurisdiction
during the tax year or period, does the taxpayer receive sufficient
benefits and protection from the laws of the taxing jurisdiction to
sustain the tax? No authorities have been found, other than the
Hazelwood case, ," which have considered this question."5
The court in the Hazelwood case, while upholding the state's
power to assess, also stated that as P's property had not been
assessed or taxed for 1960, the assessment and taxation for 1962
tended to compensate for the period which P had not paid taxes,
i.e., 1960.6 Therefore, in appraising the situation equitably, P
was not unjustly burdened. However, it is probable, that even
if P had paid West Virginia taxes for 1960, the court would have
reached the same result. That is, it appears that the court did
follow the rule that a state must give to the taxpayer, in return
39 Id. at 202.
40 Central R.R. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962); Standard
Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Cf., Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S.
473 (1925).
41 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949);
Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).42 44 IOwAL. REv. 412 (1959).
41 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 38; Central
R.R. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 39; Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra
note 40; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., supra note 41.
44 Supra note 4.
45 For purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that no question of
interstate commerce is involved.46 George F. Hazelwood Company v. Pitsenbarger, supra note 4, at 319.
[Vol. 68
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for his taxes, the benefits and protection of its laws. To explain
this, the term "tax year" or "tax period" becomes significant.
In the cases construing the tax period as the time to which the
benefits and protection of the laws of the taxing jurisdiction must
relate, the assessment period, or the point which determines tax
liability, apparently was fixed at the beginning or during the tax
period.4 7 Thus, the benefits and protection of the laws of the
taxing jurisdiction in those cases also related to the assessment
period.
The distinction between the tax period and the assessment date
becomes much clearer when the assessment date precedes the tax
period as in West Virginia.48 The term "tax year" begins to lose its
importance in relation to the time to which the benefits and
protection of the laws of the taxing jurisdiction must relate, while
the term "assessment date" assumes greater significance in this
respect. That is, if the benefits and protection of the laws of the
taxing jurisdiction are afforded to the taxed property at the assess-
ment date, the benefits and protection required for tax-action
would be satisfied. The taxpayer would have received a sufficient
quid pro quo in return for his tax dollar, and the tax imposed
upon property not located within the taxing jurisdiction during
the "tax period" would appear to be valid.4 9 While this line of
reasoning was not spelled out specifically in the Hazelwood case,
it appears that the West Virginia court did reach its conclusion
on the basis of this reasoning. While it is conceded that no case
has been found which directly supports this proposition, it is a
reasonable reconciliation of two rules of law, i.e., (1) that the
legislative body may fix the time for assessment and levy of property
taxes and (2) that the taxed property must have the benefits and
protection of the laws of the taxing jurisdiction. If this hypothesis
is not followed, however, the taxes assessed and levied prior to the
tax period are unconstitutional.
In the Hazelwood case, P had paid for the benefits and protection
of the laws when it subsequently was assessed again, apparently
for those same benefits and protections. On December 31, 1960,
47 Supra note 43.
48 George F. Hazelwood Co. v. Pitsenbarger, supra note 4.
49 While the term "tax year" loses its significance as the time to which
the benefits and protection of the law must relate, it still retains its practical
significance as a convenient period in measuring the apportionment of taxes,
especially in real estate transactions.
1966]
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P was assessed and taxes levied thereon, obstensibly for the year
1961. In reality, however, P paid only for the benefits and pro-
tection of the laws it enjoyed at that particular assessment date.
When P was assessed for taxes on July 1, 1961, it was being assessed,
not for the benefits and protection of the laws for 1962, but for the
benefits and protection it received at that moment. Even though
the language of the court stated that the taxes assessed on July 1,
1961 were for 1962, it did not state that the benefits and protections
of the laws of the state were to relate to that period. The dis-
tinction is subtle, but it is immaterial as to what particular period
the tax is to relate so long as the property taxed is assessed on
a date it receives the benefits and protection of the laws of the
taxing jurisdiction.5 If the legislature had seen fit, it could have
assessed a tax in this manner every day of the year, as long as
the property assessed was located in the taxing jurisdiction on
the assessment date.' Thus, it appears that the theory which
allows a state to assess a property tax continuously prior to the
"tax period" also operates to allow a state to tax property during
the transition from one type of assessment procedure to another."2
If this theory is not followed, the tax is unconstitutional.
By fixing a date for assessment on July 1, the legislature merely
fixed another date on which the taxpayer is to pay for the benefits
and protection of the state's laws. No illegal "double taxation"
results from this view as the assessment does not impose a dis-
criminatory tax. "Double taxation" is prohibited only where one
taxpayer contributes twice to the same burden while others con-
tribute only once.53 Assuming, arguendo, that the West Virginia
tax in the Hazelwood case was assessed on July 1, 1961 for the
benefits and protection of the laws for 1962, the tax assessed by
Maryland for that same period would not make the West Virginia
tax void. It is not unconstitutional for two states to tax identical
-oSee George F. Hazelwood Company, supra note 4, at 319.
4' Ibid. The court said that this could not be done because of the word-
ing of the West Virginia Code. W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 3, § 1 (Michie
1961). Absent such a statute, however, the court did not disapprove of such
a scheme.
62 This theory is equally applicable to the reverse situation. If the assess-
ment date were moved back to December 31, the benefits and protection
enjoyed must relate to that date. The total amount of taxes imposed during
the transition period in this case, however, would not be as great as the
taxes imposed during the transition period in the Hazelwood case. See dis-
cussion infra.
53 Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S.E. 928 (1905).
[Vol. 68
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property if it falls within each one's jurisdiction at the same time."
Double taxation in a legal sense does not exist unless the double
tax is imposed on the same property within the same jurisdiction.5,
Assuming West Virginia still followed its old assessment procedure,
if property were assessed in West Virginia on December 31 and
moved to Maryland on January I (Maryland's assessment date),
it would be difficult to argue that both jurisdictions could not tax
the property.
Taxation is only forbidden if discriminatory.56 As taxpayers in
West Virginia in 1961 paid taxes in the same manner as P in the
Hazelwood case, there was no prejudice." Each taxpayer paid
equally for the benefits and protection of the laws he received on
July 1; events subsequent to the assessment date are not determina-
tive. 8 To be sure, P paid a double amount of taxes during the
transition period beginning December 31, 1960 and ending Decem-
ber 31, 1961, but this is because it moved its property after the
assessment date. This subsequent removal, however, did not in-
validate the West Virginia tax,59 as P was paying for the benefits
and protection of the laws it received at the assessment date and
not thereafter.
Assuming that P in the Hazelwood case bad been required to
pay on July 1, 1961 for the same benefits and protection it paid for
on December 31, 1960, such a tax would not be invalid if not
discriminatory.6" The fourteenth amendment no more forbids non-
discriminatory double taxation within the state than it forbids
doubling the tax.6'
CONCLUSION
It is within the legislative province to fix an assessment date for
property taxes. This is the determinative date for imposing tax
"4 Citizens Nat1 Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99 (1921); Diefendorf v. Gallet,
51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307 (1932).55 Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914).56 State v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 64 S.E. 140 (1909).
17 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
58 Supra notes 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, 30.
9 ibid.6 0 Supra note 53.
61 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 57; Fort Smith Lumber
Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U.S. 532 (1920). But see Harris v. MaeCorkle, 146
W. Va. 946, 123 S.E.2d 888 (1962) (Double taxation should be imposed
only by the specific direction of the legislature).
10
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liability, and subsequent events will not change that liability. The
test in determining whether a state has the power to impose a
property tax is whether in return for this tax, the state gives to the
property the benefits and protection of its laws. If a state gives
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